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Offshore Wind Investment Intelligence 2026–2030: Where Capital Is Moving and Where Risks Are Rising PART II

Writer: Green Fuel Journal
Green Fuel Journal
5 hours ago
24 min read

GreenFuel Journal cover with offshore wind turbines and text: Offshore Wind Investment Intelligence 2026-2030, 2.1 GW reached FID.

7. Capital & Investment Implications

DIRECT ANSWER

The UK, Poland and Denmark attract offshore wind capital through two-way CfDs. Germany and the Netherlands are redesigning after zero-bid rounds. The US, Japan, India and the Philippines show impaired or stalled capital. Taiwan and South Korea held auctions with few bidders or little price data. China is the largest market, but the sources hold thin investor-level data on it. Cells in the matrix read "not found" where no authoritative source was located.


7.1 The Market Bankability Matrix

  • FINDING: Of twelve markets compared, only the UK (8.4 GW awarded, January 2026), Poland (3.4 GW awarded, December 2025) and Denmark (bids received, May 2026) pair a two-way CfD with a recent auction outcome.

  • SO WHAT: Markets without such a mechanism in force, namely the US, Japan and India, show cancelled, withdrawn or unissued procurement in the same period.

  • NOW WHAT: Read the "binding constraint" column first, and treat a "not found" cell as missing evidence to request, not as a negative finding.


Taiwan's Round 3.3 uses corporate power purchase agreements as the main route to market, which ties its outcome to buyer demand. Our report on corporate PPAs and how companies are rebuilding electricity procurement covers that route.

Market

Revenue mechanism

Latest auction or tender outcome

Investment or FID evidence

Price signal

Binding constraint

UK

Two-way CfD, 20-year, CPI-indexed (AR7, 14 Jan 2026)

8.4 GW awarded; AR8 window 20 Jul–7 Aug 2026, signing 31 Dec 2026–17 Mar 2027

No confirmed 2026 FID for AR7 projects (not found); Celtic Sea 1.5 GW lease agreement, 3 Mar 2026

£91.20 (England/Wales), £89.49 (Scotland), floating £216.49/MWh; 2024 prices

Partner closings (KKR); grid offers (NESO Gate 2 to Jan 2027, number issued not published)

Germany

Unsubsidised round failed; two-stage redesign, adoption proposed for 2 Sep 2026

No bids Aug 2025; 2026 auctions pushed to 2027 (N-10.1, N-10.2, 2.5 GW)

Nordlicht 1.6 GW FID, 13 Jan 2026

Proposed CfD caps 9.487 and 9.6715 ct/kWh (proposal)

Redesign status after 2 Sep 2026 not published; first CfD-funded projects from 2032

Netherlands

Temporary subsidy until a CfD in mid-2027

No bids for Nederwiek I-A, Oct 2025; 2 GW tender, deadline Dec 2026

Not found

Maximum support about €0.103–0.104/kWh (sources differ on scope)

Subsidy is temporary; decisions Q1 2027; generation from 2032

Denmark

Two-sided CfD; payment cap DKK 55.2bn for at least 2.8 GW

Bids received by 20 May 2026; results expected Jan 2027

Not found

Not found (bid levels not public)

Results pending

Poland

Two-way CfD, up to 25 years

3.4 GW+ awarded, 17 Dec 2025

Not found

PLN 476.88–492.32/MWh (about €113–117)

First power expected Dec 2032; FID not found

France

Not found (merged tender announced)

AO9 and AO10 merged into one tender of about 10 GW, 3 Apr 2026; results end-2026 or early 2027

Not found

Target average tariff below €100/MWh (a target, not a result)

Non-European component criteria; results pending

US

None at federal level; NYSERDA ended its fifth solicitation without awards, 13 Feb 2026

Federal leasing withdrawn; lease buyouts from 23 Mar 2026

No new FID identified in 2025–26; five projects in build

Not found for 2026 (Lazard LCOE $105–167/MWh is a cost, not a price)

Buyouts ($3.9bn); tax-credit start date 4 Jul 2026; Section 232 tariff decision pending

China

Market-based pricing reform with provincial mechanism-price auctions (10 Feb 2025); no offshore term found

Not found for offshore

48.4 GW installed, 6.6 GW added in 2025 (GWEC); FID not found

Shandong wind CNY 0.319/kWh (about $44.8/MWh); not offshore-specific

Thin investor-level data

Taiwan

Minimum purchase price TWD 2.29/kWh; corporate PPAs the main route

Round 3.3: two bids (Ørsted Dadu 1, 840 MW; Copenhagen Infrastructure Partners, CIP) on 3.6 GW offered; results by end-2026

Greater Changhua 2b and 4 installed, 20 Jan 2026; Cathay Life stakes

TWD 2.29/kWh minimum

Low bid count; reliance on corporate PPAs

Japan

Revised rules; price floor; 20-year capacity revenue for Rounds 2–3; no two-way CfD identified

Round 1 withdrawal, Aug 2025; re-auction status not published

Not found

Round 1 bids JPY 11.99–16.49/kWh vs JPY 29 ceiling; Aegir premium EUR 79–91/MWh

Round 4 unlikely before well into 2027 (Aegir)

South Korea

Fixed-price competitive bidding weighted to local content (statute dates not found)

1,786 MW selected from 3,656 MW bid, 2 Jul 2026

Not found; Ørsted suspended its 1.4 GW Incheon bid (Ocean Energy Resources, 28 Aug 2026)

Not found (clearing prices)

Local-content weighting; return thresholds

India

VGF for 1 GW; no PPA or tariff mechanism confirmed

4 GW and 500 MW tenders cancelled, Aug 2025; 1 GW tender not issued at 3 Jul 2026

None

Conflicting estimates: Rs 7–9 vs Rs 9.60–10.50/kWh

No bids; tariff economics unproven

T8. Market Bankability Matrix. Sources: DESNZ; Danish Energy Agency; offshoreWIND.biz; reNews; Freshfields; Windtech International; Roll Call; GWEC; Down To Earth; IEEFA; Aegir Insights. "Not found" means no authoritative source was located.


METHODOLOGY NOTE

The matrix compares twelve markets on five evidence columns: revenue mechanism, latest auction or tender outcome, investment or FID evidence, price signal, and binding constraint. Cells state what the public record shows, with a date, in plain words; a cell reads "not found" where no authoritative source was located. The matrix contains no scores, stars or rankings, and it is not a recommendation to invest in or avoid any market. Markets with thinner evidence (China, India, Japan, South Korea) show more "not found" cells, which reflects the available record, not the market.


7.2 Capital Retreat vs Capital Reallocation

  • FINDING: New commitments came from RWE (6.9 GW), SSE (a £33bn plan to 2030), Vattenfall (1.6 GW), CIP (about 1 GW in South Korea), Masdar (49% of Dogger Bank South), KKR (50% of Norfolk Vanguard), Apollo-managed funds (50% of Hornsea 3) and Cathay Life, while Shell, TotalEnergies and the Mitsubishi-led consortium retreated.

  • SO WHAT: Much of the committed capital is changing hands between owners, such as KKR and Apollo buying into projects, rather than arriving as new project finance (inference).

  • NOW WHAT: Identify who is buying the equity in any project you assess, since the buyer's closing is the signal that counts.


Our report on the new energy M&A playbook for 2026–2027 tracks the same flow of capital across clean energy platforms. Equinor's July 2025 write-down falls outside the 12-month window and is not mapped here.

Position

Company

Disclosed action

Date

Committing

KKR

Takes 50% of Norfolk Vanguard; deal expected to close in 2026

14 Jan 2026; 10 Aug 2026

Committing

Apollo-managed funds

Bought 50% of Hornsea 3 for DKK 39bn

3 Nov 2025

Committing

Masdar

Holds 49% of the 3.0 GW Dogger Bank South

14 May 2026

Committing

Vattenfall

FID on Nordlicht I and II, 1.6 GW

13 Jan 2026

Committing

SSE

£33bn plan to 2030 (£27bn networks, £6bn renewables and flexibility); Berwick Bank Phase B won in AR7

28 May 2026

Committing

CIP; Cathay Life

CIP won about 1 GW in Korea and bid in Taiwan; Cathay Life holds Greater Changhua stakes

2 Jul 2026; 20 Jan 2026

Mixed

RWE

6.9 GW AR7 win and higher capex; settlement with US Interior over leases

14 Jan 2026; 10 Aug 2026

Mixed

Ørsted

About DKK 46bn divested and Korea projects sidelined; Taiwan Dadu 1 bid and Hornsea 3 build continue

2025–2026

Retreating

Mitsubishi-led consortium

Withdrew from all three Japan Round 1 sites

Aug 2025

Retreating

Shell

Exit from Atlantic Shores

Date not published

Retreating

TotalEnergies

Lease refund of $928m (Roll Call)

23 Mar 2026

T7. Capital retreat vs reallocation map. Sources: company announcements; RWE; Ørsted; SSE; offshoreWIND.biz; CT Mirror (23 March 2026); Roll Call (30 September 2026); WorkBoat.


METHODOLOGY NOTE

Companies are placed in "committing", "restructuring or retreating" or "mixed" using their own disclosures and dated public announcements: a new FID, award or equity purchase counts as committing; a withdrawal, impairment-led exit, sell-down or suspended bid counts as retreating or restructuring. Firms with both are marked mixed. Companies without 2026 evidence in public sources are omitted. The map describes disclosed actions, not intentions.


7.3 How FID Is Being Funded: Sell-Downs, Recycling and Public Intervention

  • FINDING: FID funding is coming from partner equity sales (KKR 50% of Norfolk Vanguard; Apollo 50% of Hornsea 3 for DKK 39bn), Ørsted's rights issue of about DKK 60bn and divestments of about DKK 46bn, and US Judgment Fund buyouts covering 12 agreements and about 19.2 GW for $3.9bn.

  • SO WHAT: In Europe, equity sales fund new construction, while in the US public money reimburses developers who are leaving (inference), so the same capital recycling means different things in each market.

  • NOW WHAT: Track the buyout lawsuits, since nine Democratic attorneys general are suing and the outcome could change the price of exit.


Seven states sued over the TotalEnergies refund in June 2026, and California sued on 22 September 2026 over the $111.77m Invenergy Morro Bay lease deal. Vestas's firm order ahead of FID shows suppliers reserving slots before capital is committed.


7.4 What Investors Should Price

  • FINDING: An Ørsted white paper (2025, developer-authored) says investors typically need capture prices of at least about €90/MWh and that about 54 GW of communicated European capacity from 2029, about 45% of capacity commissioned from 2029 onwards, is merchant or sits under a CfD ceiling below expected LCOE.

  • SO WHAT: That is one developer's view, but it points to the same four items the wider evidence supports: revenue-risk design, cost of capital, sponsor sell-down status and the limits of single-source data.

  • NOW WHAT: Price each of the four separately, and mark any assumption that rests on a single-source figure.


Electricity buyers shape the revenue side too, and our analysis of 24/7 carbon-free energy as a corporate electricity strategy covers how buyer procurement is changing. Investors comparing offshore wind with other capital-intensive low-carbon assets can read our small modular reactors investment report.


8. Future Scenarios & Forecast (2026–2035)

DIRECT ANSWER

Published offshore wind forecasts diverge by publisher: GWEC projects 420 GW by end-2035 after 24% annual growth over 2026–2030, TGS | 4C projects 474 GW by 2040 after cutting its 2030 outlook by 28%, and the IEA cut its five-year forecast by more than 25%. The nearest test is the fourth quarter of 2026, when about 3.5 GW of FID must close to reach the 5.6 GW TGS | 4C expects.


8.1 Published Forecasts and What Each Assumes

  • FINDING: GWEC expects more than 327 GW of additions to reach 420 GW by end-2035, above 50 GW a year by 2035, while TGS | 4C expects 474 GW by 2040 and the IEA cut its five-year outlook by more than 25% on 8 October 2025.

  • SO WHAT: No source we found gives a quantified 2026–2030 forecast from BNEF, Wood Mackenzie or Rystad, so the published range rests on three bodies with different assumptions.

  • NOW WHAT: Quote each forecast with its publisher and date, and ask which FID volume it assumes before comparing it with another.


Wood Mackenzie's November 2025 outlook expects offshore additions to more than double in 2026 and about 75% of planned capacity to be under construction already, with a build-out slowdown from 2028; it gives no GW forecast in its public summary. BNEF's US offshore forecast to 2035 fell from 39 GW to 5.9 GW, according to a relay by Inside Climate News.

Malgosia Bartosik, CEO of WindEurope, said on 26 January 2026:

"Government cooperation on offshore wind buildout can help crowd in €1trillion of investments in the next decade."

Readers weighing offshore wind against other long-horizon themes can see our Green Molecules Economy 2035 analysis.


8.2 Three Conditional Pathways

  • FINDING: Three pathways follow from the evidence: FID recovery, slow conversion and policy shock, each defined by observable triggers such as the 5.6 GW year-end FID expectation and the 41.2 GW under construction.

  • SO WHAT: No published source supports probabilities, so the pathways describe conditions and signposts and rank nothing by likelihood.

  • NOW WHAT: Pick the first signpost for each pathway and check it as it arrives, starting with the KKR closing and the Q4 2026 FID count.

Pathway

Triggers

Evidence supporting it

What an investor would see first

(i) FID recovery

AR7 partner closings land; German, Dutch and Danish CfD rounds attract bids

AR7 awarded 8.4 GW; Denmark drew bids in May 2026; Vestas firm order of 1,380 MW; about 3.5 GW of Q4 FID needed to reach 5.6 GW

KKR closing and AR7 FID announcements; Danish results in January 2027

(ii) Slow conversion

FID stays near the 2026 level; cost of capital stays high; commissioning thins from the late 2020s

Borrowing near 15-year highs; steel up 53%; Vestas offshore order intake 0 MW in Q2 2026; Wood Mackenzie warns of a slowdown from 2028

Q4 2026 FID count below 5.6 GW; partner deals slipping; further impairments

(iii) Policy shock

A further adverse move in the US, or a CfD design failure in a major market

Section 232 tariff decision "no earlier than Sept 2026"; buyouts and lawsuits; Germany's stage 2 CfD applies only if stage 1 draws no bid

Tariff decision; a zero-bid round; court rulings on buyouts

T10. Scenario pathways, triggers and signposts. Sources: TGS | 4C (21–22 September 2026); GWEC (9 June 2026); IEA (8 October 2025); Wood Mackenzie via GreentechLead (November 2025); Roll Call (30 September 2026); Freshfields. The order of rows is not a likelihood ranking.


METHODOLOGY NOTE

The three pathways are conditional descriptions, not forecasts, and carry no probability weights, because no published source supports assigning them. Each pathway is defined by observable triggers (AR7 partner closings and FIDs, the outcomes of the German, Dutch and Danish CfD rounds, US policy actions, long-term borrowing costs) and anchored to published forecasts from GWEC, TGS | 4C and the IEA. The order in which the pathways are presented reflects analyst judgement of the current evidence and is not a likelihood ranking.


8.3 Decision Calendar: Signposts Through 2028

  • FINDING: Nine gates fall between the second half of 2026 and 2028, from a Nova Scotia call for bids and the Philippines' tentative auction reset on 1 December 2026 to Victoria's awards in 2028.

  • SO WHAT: Most of the gates are procurement results, so they test whether CfD design is pulling bids in, not whether projects are financed.

  • NOW WHAT: Add the Q4 2026 FID count to the calendar and weigh the financing signals above the auction results.

Date

Gate

Why it matters

H2 2026 (date not published)

Nova Scotia (Wind West) first call for bids

Seven prequalified bidders; 5 GW initial phase

1 Dec 2026 (tentative)

Philippines GEA-5 auction reset

Tests readiness on ports, grid and permitting

Dec 2026

Netherlands tender deadline

2 GW with temporary subsidy; decisions Q1 2027

By end-2026

Taiwan Round 3.3 results

Two bids on 3.6 GW offered

End-2026 or early 2027

France merged tender results

About 10 GW; tariff target below €100/MWh

31 Dec 2026–17 Mar 2027

UK AR8 contract signing

Next UK round

Jan 2027

Denmark tender results

First results after the CfD switch

2027

Germany N-10.1 and N-10.2 auction

2.5 GW; first test of the redesign

2028

Victoria (Australia) awards

2 GW; RFP window to August 2027

T9. Decision calendar. Sources: Ocean Energy Resources (30 July 2026); offshoreWIND.biz (6 April 2026, 3 April 2026); reNews; Windtech International (1 June 2026); Windtech International (28 January 2026); Energy Global (26 August 2026); EnergyNow (3 July 2026).


8.4 What the 2026 FID Count Implies for 2027–2030

  • FINDING: With 41.2 GW under construction and 7.1 GW at FID (TGS | 4C), commissioning is supported through about 2029, and Wood Mackenzie warns of a build-out slowdown from 2028 in qualitative terms.

  • SO WHAT: GWEC's 24% compound growth for 2026–2030 needs FID well above the 2026 level (inference), so a low 2026 count threatens the later years more than the near term.

  • NOW WHAT: Judge any 2029–2030 capacity forecast by the FID volume it requires in 2026 and 2027.

  • This is analyst reading, not a published forecast. We found no independent 2027–2030 commissioning forecast derived from the 2026 FID count.


9. Strategic Recommendations

DIRECT ANSWER

Offshore wind investors should screen on revenue-risk design first, require a signed equity partner or funded sponsor second, and stress-test for a one-point rise in financing cost third. They should treat single-source figures as provisional. The order matters: a project that fails the first gate does not become investable by passing the third. Single-source inputs need checking on the publisher's own page before they enter a model. These are screening steps from the evidence in this report, not investment advice.


9.1 For Investors

  • FINDING: The evidence supports a three-gate screen in a fixed order: revenue-risk design, sponsor funding route, and cost-of-capital environment, applied to a market or a project.

  • SO WHAT: A project that fails the first gate, such as one with no two-way revenue mechanism in force, does not become investable by passing the third.

  • NOW WHAT: Run the five checks below on each opportunity, in order, and record which gate it first fails.


1. Revenue-risk design. Is a two-way CfD in force, indexed and long enough to lend against? (Sections 2.3 and 7.1)

2. Procurement stage. Is the project awarded with FID pending, or still pre-auction, and what contract and consent evidence supports that stage? (Section 2.2)

3. Sponsor funding route. Is an equity partner signed, and has the deal closed? (Sections 5.2 and 7.3)

4. Financing-cost buffer. Does the return still hold with financing cost one percentage point higher, using the 9–11% sensitivity? (Section 4.3)

5. Evidence quality. Which inputs are single-source, and have they been checked on the publisher's own page? (Section 1.2)


METHODOLOGY NOTE

The screen applies three gates in a fixed order (revenue-risk design, sponsor funding route, cost-of-capital environment) and returns one of three descriptive outcomes. The logic is structured analyst judgement drawn from Sections 4, 6 and 7 and has not been tested against project returns or outcomes. It reports whether the evidence supports further diligence; it is not investment advice and does not estimate returns.


Then watch the decision calendar in Section 8.3 for the gates that confirm or break the case. For a Northbank-style project, the worked example in Section 4.3 shows how quickly a thin margin disappears. One specific action: before the Q4 2026 FID count is published, ask each sponsor on your watchlist whether its equity partner has closed, and set aside any pipeline figure that cannot name the contract behind it.


9.2 For Industry

  • FINDING: Japan's Round 1 winners bid at JPY 11.99–16.49/kWh against a JPY 29 ceiling and later faced costs reported to have more than doubled, and Japan's reforms now allow up to 40% cost inflation to pass into the price.

  • SO WHAT: Developers that bid without inflation protection carry a risk the contract does not price, and Vestas's early order shows sponsors reserving supply ahead of FID.

  • NOW WHAT: Bid only with an explicit inflation mechanism, close the equity partner before FID, and reserve turbine slots as Vestas and RWE did for Norfolk Vanguard West.


A shared FID definition is also needed: WindEurope's 0.6 GW financed in H1 2026 and Vattenfall's 1.6 GW decision in January cannot be reconciled without one.


9.3 For Policymakers

  • FINDING: Auctions with unsubsidised or negative-bid designs drew no bids in Germany (August 2025), the Netherlands (October 2025) and Denmark (December 2024), and the Philippines suspended its 3.3 GW auction on 4 July 2026 to align it with port, grid and permitting readiness.

  • SO WHAT: Contract design and sequencing decide whether bidders turn up, and Europe's move to two-way CfDs shows the correction is available.

  • NOW WHAT: Design two-way CfDs with inflation indexation, and sequence auctions after grid and port readiness, not before.


Rebecca Williams of GWEC said in the 9 June 2026 report release:

"Greater attention also needs to be given to ensuring market mechanisms such as CfDs are well designed to deliver bankable projects."

Grid-connection timing matters as much: NESO's Gate 2 offers run to January 2027, and the number issued is not published.

Audience

Action

Evidence in this report

Investors

Screen on revenue design, then sponsor funding, then a one-point financing stress test

Sections 2.3, 4.3, 7.1, 7.3

Industry

Bid with inflation protection; close equity partners before FID; reserve supply slots; report FID on a stated definition

Sections 4.2, 5.2, 5.4, 5.3

Policymakers

Two-way CfDs with indexation; sequence auctions after grid and port readiness

Sections 2.3, 5.4, 6.1, 8.3

T14. Recommendations by audience. All actions are conditional screening steps drawn from the evidence cited.


9.4 The Position for Energy Investors

  • FINDING: The projects, awards and consents exist, but only 2.1 GW has reached FID in 2026, and the evidence ties the next move to three observable events: the KKR closing on Norfolk Vanguard, the first AR7 FID, and the fourth-quarter FID count against the 5.6 GW TGS | 4C expects.

  • SO WHAT: Those three events test the three gates in this report, namely a funded equity partner, a contract-backed commitment and a return that survives higher financing cost, so they carry more information than any further auction result.

  • NOW WHAT: Before 31 December 2026, give each offshore wind exposure a one-line status against the three events, and treat any new exposure that cannot name a closed equity partner, a two-way contract in force and a return that holds with financing cost one percentage point higher as not yet screened in.


10. Executive FAQ


Why is offshore wind FID activity lagging behind project development in 2026?

Cost of capital, offtake design and partner sell-downs are holding decisions back. TGS | 4C counts only 2.1 GW at FID in 2026 so far against more than 12 GW entering operation, and long-term borrowing sits near 15-year highs. The pipeline exists, since GWEC counts about 25 GW of consented projects outside China awaiting FID. The 2.1 GW figure is single-source.


Which offshore wind markets are attracting the most investment through 2030?

The UK, Poland and Denmark are drawing the most offshore wind capital, because two-way CfDs are in force there. UK AR7 awarded 8.4 GW in January 2026, Poland awarded 3.4 GW in December 2025, and Denmark drew bids in May 2026. Germany and the Netherlands are redesigning their auctions after zero-bid rounds, and China is the largest installed market at 48.4 GW (GWEC) but has thin investor-level data.


What are the biggest offshore wind investment risks between 2026 and 2030?

Cost of capital, auction and offtake design, and US policy rank highest on our reading of the evidence. Grid and supply-chain constraints, developer balance sheets and permitting follow. The ranking is analyst judgement, not a score, and curtailment risk is unquantified for offshore wind because no offshore-specific data exists.


How much do interest rates and the cost of capital change offshore wind project economics?

A one-point rise in financing cost raises the cost of electricity by about 9–11%, according to TGS | 4C (single-source). Ørsted tied a DKK 1.2bn Q2 2026 US impairment to higher long-dated US interest rates. Only the one-point effect is sourced, so larger rate moves should not be extrapolated from it.


What does the gap between offshore wind pipelines and FID mean for investors?

Pipeline size says little about investable capital. Commissioning through about 2029 is supported by 41.2 GW under construction, so the FID shortfall bites later (inference). Check whether a project has a signed offtake contract and a funded sponsor before treating its pipeline stage as evidence.


Does winning an offshore wind auction mean a project will actually be built?

No. UK AR7 cleared 19.29–20.81% below administrative prices, but no AR7 project has a confirmed FID as of 1 October 2026. The Mitsubishi-led consortium won all three of Japan's Round 1 sites in 2021 and withdrew in August 2025.


Is India's offshore wind market investable yet?

No, India's offshore wind market is not investable on current evidence. India has no awarded offshore project, cancelled a 4 GW and a 500 MW tender in August 2025, and had not issued its 1 GW tender by 3 July 2026. A Rs 7,453 crore scheme exists, but tariff estimates conflict at Rs 7–9/kWh against Rs 9.60–10.50/kWh.


Will floating offshore wind become investable before 2030?

Floating offshore wind is investable before 2030 only as a policy-supported niche on present evidence. UK AR7 cleared floating wind at £216.49/MWh for just 0.1925 GW, and GWEC counts 1.5 GW of floating capacity with active offtake and 5.9 GW committed through auctions. No verified independent global floating LCOE is published in the sources reviewed.


12. References & Strategic Sources


12.1 Research Limitations

Three gaps limit the conclusions most: the 2026 FID count comes from one publisher, no second source confirms cost on a common basis, and India rests on trade press with no primary government document.

Several key documents were available only in part or through third-party listings, including the IEA World Energy Investment 2026, BNEF's Energy Transition Investment Trends 2026, the GWEC 2026 report and the IRENA 2025 cost report. Readers should check each figure against its live source before use.


The only 2026 FID volume (2.1 GW so far, 5.6 GW expected) comes from TGS | 4C, whose country breakdown, project list and FID definition are not public. Whether China is included is not stated, and only one 2026 FID is named in public sources, Vattenfall's Nordlicht in Germany. No FID is confirmed for any UK AR7 project, or for Taiwanese, Korean, Chinese or US projects. BNEF's 72% fall in H1 2026 offshore wind investment has no accessible dollar figure, and we found no country-level split of offshore investment.


No central cost figure is confirmed by two independent sources on the same basis. LCOE differs between IRENA ($78/MWh), BNEF ($100/MWh) and Lazard (US, $105–167/MWh) because the datasets cover different projects and regions. CAPEX and OPEX come from one official source, the UK DESNZ study of July 2025, plus one secondary paper for China. Capacity baselines differ (GWEC 92.5 GW, IRENA 91.4 GW from a headline only, Orrick 89.2 GW) and we did not reconcile them. We found no independent quantified 2026–2030 additions forecast from BNEF, Wood Mackenzie or Rystad.


Curtailment and negative-price data cover all renewables, mainly solar, so they do not show the effect on offshore wind. We found no offshore capture-rate analysis, vessel day rates, HVDC cable lead times or country-by-country 2026 European FID figures. The German redesign, the Dutch tender scope and the Danish cap rest on press and law-firm summaries, not regulator documents. For the US we found no new FID in 2025–2026 and no outcomes for the buyout lawsuits.


China evidence is thin: we found no 2026 year-to-date additions, provincial offshore targets or investment volumes, and the 100 GW by 2030 figure rests on state-linked media. For India we found no confirmed status of the 1 GW tender after 3 July 2026 and read no primary document from MNRE, PIB, CERC, SECI or NIWE; tariff estimates conflict and their basis is unknown. We also found no Japanese Round 1 re-auction status, Korean clearing prices, Taiwanese Round 3.3 results or Philippine ceiling prices. The Gulf produced no offshore wind project, tender or regulation, and Brazil and Sub-Saharan Africa yielded only regulatory steps, a licensing queue, one stalled project and a World Bank resource study.


No quote came from a regulator, a minister speaking first-hand, or any company in China, India, Brazil, the Gulf, Africa, Japan or Korea. The UK DESNZ cost study (24 July 2025) and the Ørsted white paper (2025, authors unnamed) are older or developer-authored and are marked as such in the text.


12.2 References

Format: Source Name │ Document Title │ Date │ URL. † marks a title taken from the page address. "Date not shown" means the page carried no date.


Global and cross-regional


North America


UK and EU


China and Asia-Pacific


India, Brazil, Gulf and Africa


© 2026 Green Fuel Journal · GreenFuelJournal.com. All rights reserved. Chart design and compilation are the property of Green Fuel Journal; underlying data belongs to the sources cited.

 
 
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